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INTRODUCTION
Once there was a tree ... and she loved a little boy.
And every day the boy would come and he would gather
her leaves and make them into crowns and play king of
the forest. He would climb up her trunk and swing from
her branches and eat apples. And they would play hide-
and-go-seek. And when he was tired, he would sleep in
her shade. And the boy loved the tree ... very much.
And the tree was happy.'
t J.D., Cornell Law School, 2001; B.S. University of Utah, 1996. I would like to thank
Tina Groves for being my Primary Ticket Holder.
I SHEL SILVERSTEIN, THE GIVING TREE 1-23 (1964).
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The children's book, The Giving Tree, tells the story of a relation-
ship between a tree and a little boy.2 The tree was the boy's caretaker;
she played with him, gave him sustenance and shelter, and above all,
loved him unconditionally. 3 Although this story could serve as a meta-
phor for the traditional parent-child relationship, it could also represent
many different types of caring relationships where there is no biological
tie or legal relationship.
Traditionally, the law defines a family as a group of individuals
related by blood, marriage, or adoption. 4 However, millions of Ameri-
cans are structuring their lives outside of the traditional notion of family
recognized at law.5 Social and technological changes have caused a mul-
tiplication of various family forms distinctly different from this tradi-
tional definition, including heterosexual cohabitants (with or without
children), 6 same-sex partners (with or without children), 7 single-parent
households,8 blended families, 9 networks of extended kin,10 non-related
individuals that form surrogate families, 1 ' and others. These familial ar-
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Kris Franklin, "A Family Like Any Other Family:" Alternative Methods of Defining
Family Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1027, 1029 (1992).
5 Married With Children? Not Likely/Survey: Traditional Family a Minority, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 25, 1999 at A38 (stating that only 26% of American households contain married couples
with children, with 51% of those children living with their "two original parents").
6 The 1970 census counted 523,000 unmarried heterosexual couples. By 1998, the
number had risen to 4,236,000, with 1,520,000 households containing children under the age
of 15. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. PPL-101, HISTORICAL
TIME SERIES: LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF ADULTS, UNMARRIED-COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS, BY
PRESENCE OF CHILDREN: 1960 TO PRESENT, TABLE AD-2.
7 One million six hundred seventy four thousand (1,674,000) respondents reported liv-
ing with a same-sex partner, with 166,000 households containing children under the age of 15.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. PPL-101, UNPUBLISHED TA-
BLES-MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE), TABLE 8-
HOUSEHOLDS WITH Two UNRELATED ADULTS, BY MARITAL STATUS, AGE, AND SEX.
8 Single parents maintain 27.3 percent of family households with children under the age
of eighteen. LYNNE M. CASPER & KEN BRYSON, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, PUB. No. P20-515, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY
CHARACTERISTICS, MARCH 1998 (UPDATE).
9 Families created by blending biological children, step children, adopted children, and
foster children.
10 Five and six-tenths percent (5.6%) of all children under 18 reside in the home of their
grandparents. TERRY A. LUGAILA, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB.
No. P20-514, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS,
MARCH 1998 (UPDATE). One million four hundred forty six thousand (1,446,000) children
under 18 live in the household of a relative other than a parent. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. PPL-101, UNPUBLISHED TABLES-MARITAL STATUS AND LIV-
ING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE), TABLE 4-HouSEHOLD RELATIONSHIP AND
PRESENCE OF PARENTS FOR PERSONS UNDER 18 YEARS, BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC
ORIGIN [hereinafter TABLE 4].
1 1 Non-family households account for 30.9 percent of U.S. households; 83.2 percent of
these were individuals residing alone, while the remaining were comprised of non-related indi-
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rangements all have the ability to provide for the material and psycholog-
ical needs of their members, yet only some are given the socio-legal
status "family" and the benefits and rights that accompany such a desig-
nation. This, along with the lack of uniformity in defining family rela-
tionships, makes it difficult for individuals to be sure of their rights and
responsibilities. Arguably, this problem should be remedied by altering
the way that the law defines family; "[i]f law does not reflect or even
acknowledge institutions central to our lives, then it cannot truly serve its
role as a social mediator and a protector of social values.' 12
So, what is to be done with the concept of family? In Part I, I will
present various remedies offered to solve the problem of families falling
outside the narrow categories established at law, and offer a critique of
such remedies. I will then pose the question: What if we could start from
scratch without common law or legal precedent to follow? What would
be the most fair, equitable, and efficient way to legally recognize fami-
lies? In Part II, I will lay out the groundwork for a new theory of family,
called the Ticket System. At its most simplistic level, by exchanging
Tickets with one another, individuals designate whom they want to have
considered their family, complete with the legally concomitant rights,
privileges, and responsibilities. Although this is a largely impractical
proposal, I hope that it will change the way that people think about famil-
ial relationships and inform the debate about what should be done to
ensure that all families are protected and valued.
I. CHANGING THE DEFINITION OF FAMILY
There are those that function as a family and are dedicated and de-
voted to one another, who do not receive the law's protections. Equally
troubling are those instances where individuals use the legal designation
of family merely to receive benefits, access to economic wealth, or other
status afforded by marriage, parentage, or other family relations. 13 Such
inequity has mobilized some judges, politicians, lawyers, scholars, and
activists, creating a subtle shift in the legal landscape for nontraditional
families. However, most of the remedies offered seem inadequate in one
viduals residing together. CASPER & BRYSON, supra note 8. One million six hundred forty
three thousand (1,643,000) children under 18 live in the household of a non-relative. TABLE 4,
supra note 10.
12 Franklin, supra note 4, at 1068.
13 Examples of this would include sham weddings for immigration purposes, or long lost
relatives coming out of the woodwork upon a family member winning the lottery or becoming
a celebrity. One particularly egregious example occurred February 15, 2000 when the Fox
television network presented "Who Wants to Marry a Multimillionaire?" Fox Mocks Love,
Trust: Another View, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 19, 2000, at A10. In this combination beauty
pageant/game show, a millionaire bachelor selected his wife from fifty contestants. Id. The
"winner" promptly married the millionaire bachelor minutes after seeing him for the first time.
Id. The couple divorced a short time later.
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way or another. Unfortunately, within an inequitable framework, some-
times the only solution is dismantling that framework and starting over.
A. EQUITABLE JUDICIAL REMEDIES
In the following section, I will discuss two ways that the judiciary
has attempted to alleviate some of the harsh results found when those
who fall outside the traditional definition of family turn to the law for
protection. Although it is commendable that courts are attempting to
adapt the law to respond to the changes in society, the results have been
less than ideal.
1. Implied Cohabitation Contracts
The landmark case of Marvin v. Marvin is one of the earliest exam-
ples of the law of modifying familial concepts to accommodate societal
changes. Since that time, courts have become increasingly willing to
give some of the traditional benefits of marriage to cohabitants upon dis-
solution of a relationship.14
In Marvin, a woman gave up her career in the entertainment field to
serve as a "companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook" for her male
partner in return for his provision of "all of [her] financial support and
needs for the rest of her life."' 15 Upon dissolution of the relationship, the
woman was forced to rely on unemployment insurance benefits to sup-
port herself, while her ex-partner's property at the time of separation
exceeded $1,000,000.16 Ms. Marvin sued to enforce an implied contract
whereby she was entitled to half of the property acquired during the rela-
tionship and support payments.17
The Supreme Court of California found that "courts should enforce
express contracts between nonmarital partners, [and] [i]n the absence of
an express contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the
parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied con-
tract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other under-
standing between the parties."' 18 The court also suggested the use of
constructive or resulting trusts, quantum meruit, and "additional equita-
ble remedies to protect the expectations of parties to a nonmarital rela-
tionship in cases in which existing remedies prove inadequate."' 19
14 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
15 Id.
16 Marvin v. Marvin, 5 Fan. L. Rep. (BNA) 3077 (Cal. 1979).
17 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.
18 Id.
19 Id. at n.25.
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Fifteen states have adopted the Marvin approach, at least in part,20
giving cohabitating couples some legal benefits. 21 Nonetheless, the deci-
sion provided little assistance to Ms. Marvin22 and has not benefited
other couples to a great degree. Frequently, the law fails to recognize
heterosexual cohabitants as similar to spouses in regards to car insur-
ance, 23 health insurance,24 unemployment benefits, 25 the marital commu-
20 See Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923 (Ariz. 1986); Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142
(Conn. 1987); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. App. 1980); Carlson v. Olson, 256
N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 922 (Mo. App. 1987); Kinkenon
v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77 (Neb. 1981); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672 (Nev. 1984); Rolle v. Rolle,
530 A.2d 847 (N.J. Sup. 1987); Dominguez v. Cruz, 617 P.2d 1322 (N.M. App. 1980); Mc-
Cullon v. McCullon, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1978); Ireland v. Flanagan, 627 P.2d 496 (Or. App.
1981); Knauer v. Knauer, 470 A.2d 553 (Pa. Super. 1983); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430
(W. Va. 1990); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d
594 (Wyo. 1981).
21 See Donovan v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1982) (allowing
good faith members of employee's household to be considered dependent and entitled to work-
ers compensation benefits); Solomon v. District of Columbia, 21 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1316
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1995) (allowing a deceased woman's lesbian partner to prove that she was
next of kin to maintain a wrongful death action); Reep v. Comm'r of Dep't of Employment &
Training, 593 N.E. 2d 1297 (Mass. 1992) (holding that the fact that former employee was not
married to her relocating partner of 13 years did not preclude determination that she had "ur-
gent, compelling and necessitous" reason to leave her employment); Dunphey v. Gregor, 642
A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994) (holding that bystander's ability to recover for emotional distress upon
witnessing injury is not necessarily limited to relationships of marriage or blood).
22 On remand the trial court awarded Ms. Marvin $104,000 under equity, in order to
acquire employable skills with which to support herself. Marvin v. Marvin, 5 Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA) 3077 (Cal. 1979). The appellate court reversed the trial court's award because Mr.
Marvin "never had and did not then have any obligation to provide [Ms. Marvin] with a rea-
sonable sum for support and maintenance." Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (1981).
One day after the appellate court's reversal, Ms. Marvin, age 57, was fined $250 and placed on
probation for shoplifting bras and a sweater. HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 234 (4th ed. 1998).
23 Wood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 429 A.2d 1082 (N.J. 1981) (holding that a
woman who had been living and sharing expenses with the insured for approximately three
and one-half years prior to the accident was not entitled to coverage under the terms of an
automobile insurance policy extending personal injury protection coverage to members of
named insured's family residing in his household).
24 I.R.S. Priv. Lit. Rul. 9603011 (Jan. 19, 1996), 1996 WL 18211 (stating that employer
benefits made available to domestic partners will be taxed as income); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9034048 (Aug. 24, 1990), 1990 WL 700170 amended by I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9111018 (Mar.
15, 1991), 1991 WL 77745 (stating that employer benefits made available to nonspouse cohab-
itants will be taxed as income).
25 Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d 904 (Cal. 1983) (holding that
termination of employment in order to follow nonmarital "loved one" to a location did not
constitute "good cause" for purposes of determining eligibility to receive unemployment com-
pensation benefits). But see Macgregor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 689 P.2d 453
(Cal. 1984) (holding that when a woman moved with her cohabitant and their child there was
"good cause," thus allowing her to receive employment benefits).
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nication privilege, 26 wrongful death actions,27 survivors benefits under
Social Security, 28 tax preferences, 29 or joint bankruptcy. 30
Also, states that provide cohabitation remedies to heterosexual
couples may not provide them to same-sex couples. For example, when
the California courts considered a same-sex couple case analogous to
Marvin, they chose not to enforce an implied contract. In Jones v. Daly,
Mr. Jones acted as companion, homemaker, traveling companion, house-
keeper, and cook to Mr. Daly, in return for an agreement of support. 31
After Mr. Daly's death, Mr. Jones sued the estate for declaratory relief
and a division of the property acquired throughout the relationship. 32
Mr. Jones was unsuccessful in his claim because the court found that the
rendition of sexual services "was the predominate consideration" under
the contract, 33 rather than the time spent in providing domestic ser-
vices.34 This view of same-sex couples as fundamentally different from
their heterosexual counterparts prevents these couples from using prece-
dent such as Marvin to their benefit. 35
26 People v. Delph, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1979) (holding that the common law and statu-
tory marital communication privilege does not extend to cohabitants who have established a
marriage-like relationship).
27 Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 184 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1982) (holding that fiancde of
decedent, who was engaged to marry decedent eight days after his death and who had cohab-
ited with him, was not entitled to bring wrongful death action); Harrod v. Pac. Southwest
Airlines, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1981) (holding that meretricious spouse of decedent was not an
"heir" who could bring a wrongful death action, and that the statute excluding meretricious
spouses from bringing wrongful death actions did not deny such individuals equal protection
of laws).
28 Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (denying woman benefits under Section
202(g)(1) of the Social Security Act because she was never married to the wage earner who
fathered her child).
29 In re Edgett, 68 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1980) (holding that a former wife of a testator who
had resumed cohabiting with deceased four years after the dissolution of their marriage, held
themselves out to friends and neighbors as husband and wife, shared a condominium, and
jointly paid their bills, was treated as a unrelated transferee under section 13309 of the Rev. &
Tax Code, rather than as a wife under section 13307).
30 In re Allen, 186 B.R. 769 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that it is necessary for a
couple to be legally married in order to file joint bankruptcy).
31 Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 131 (1981).
32 Id. at 130.
33 Id. at 133.
34 Compare Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, with Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
In Marvin, the court found that the sexual relationship between Mr. and Ms. Marvin was
severable from the rest of the contract and only considered Mr. Marvin's promise of lifelong
support and equal share of the property, in return for Ms. Marvin's agreement to be a compan-
ion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116, n.5. It is necessary for the
sexual services to be severable from the rest of the contract, because courts are unwilling to
enforce a cohabitation contract "to the extent that it explicitly rests upon the immoral and illicit
consideration of meretricious sexual service." Id. at 112.
35 But see Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1988). In Whorton, sexual ser-
vices were severable from the rest of the contract, because the services Mr. Whorton provided
his partner, such as being his chauffeur, bodyguard, secretary, and real-estate counselor, in
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2. The Functional Approach
Another way the judiciary has expanded the legal concept of family
is through the application of the "functional approach." Under this ap-
proach, social arrangements are organized around the household, where
"a household becomes the functional equivalent of a family. '36 One ex-
ample of courts applying this approach occurred in the case of Braschi v.
Stahl Associates.37 In that case, a New York court upheld the right of the
same-sex partner of a deceased leaseholder to qualify as a family mem-
ber under the state rent control laws, and thus maintain residence in the
couple's apartment.38
In deciding this case, the court attempted to consider the totality of
the relationship by considering a number of factors, such as "the exclu-
sivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and finan-
cial commitment, the manner in which the parties [had] conducted their
everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the reliance
placed upon one another for daily family services."'39 Although the court
stated that none of these factors should be dispositive, and that the "dedi-
cation, caring and self-sacrifice of the parties should ... control," it is
difficult to see how the court would make this determination absent the
enumerated factors.40 Indeed, the court did not discuss the couple's level
of devotion to one another, instead they recited the amount of time they
had lived together, that Braschi listed the address on his driver's license
and passport, and received all correspondence at that address, and that
the couple "were authorized signatories of three safe-deposit boxes, they
maintained joint checking and savings accounts, and joint credit cards. 4 1
Rather than truly looking at the function of the couples, it seems as
though the court was looking at criteria that one would hope to find in a
stereotypical 1950s marriage. With the day-to-day realities of our com-
plex society, it is easy to see the potential problems with such an ap-
proach. What if a couple relies on restaurants, dry cleaners, and the like
to obtain "daily family service," or wants to keep their finances separate
for reasons ranging from tax planning to government benefits eligibility,
addition to confidant and companion, are the type that one would normally be paid for. Id. at
406-07, 409. Thus, Mr. Whorton was able to recover. Id. The court distinguished this case
from Jones, by stating that Jones was "factually different in that the complaining party did not
allege contracting to provide services apart from those normally incident to the state of cohabi-
tation itself." Id. at 410. However, neither did Ms. Marvin, and she was still able to enforce the
implied contract. Marvin, 557 P.2d. at 110.
36 Rebecca L. Melton, Note, The Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosex-
ual Couples and Evolving Definitions of Family. 29 J. Fam. L. 497, 498 (1990/1991).
37 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
38 Id. at 55.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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or works in different cities and only sees one another on the weekends?
Does this mean a couple is less committed than their married counter-
parts, who are not required to share checking accounts and credit cards,
live together, be monogamous, or even love each other?42
As it turns out, the functional approach is not only problematic in its
application, but has been of little practical benefit to nontraditional fami-
lies. New York courts have limited the holding of Braschi to its facts,43
and have refused to extend the functional approach to estates44 and same-
sex partners for wrongful death claims,45 and have not allowed a same-
sex partner to elect against decedent's will as a surviving spouse,46 re-
fused to allow a lesbian co-parent access to her non-biological child,47
refused to protect confidential communications between same-sex part-
ners, 48 and not allowed same-sex partners to reside together in university
married-student housing.49
B. USE OF EXISTING LEGAL DEVICES
Rather than relying on the courts, some nontraditional families have
made creative use of existing legal devices in order to replicate certain
familial benefits. However, as with judicial equitable remedies, these
approaches are fraught with problems.
1. Tools for Dealing with Medical Emergencies and Death
Because nontraditional families are not afforded equal status under
the law, they often face legal battles and invalid presumptions at the time
when their loved ones are in crisis. Such a situation occurred when
Karen Thompson's partner of four years, Sharon Kowalski, was left
physically and mentally impaired after an accident with a drunk driver.50
Kowalski's father, who was not aware of his daughter's relationship at
the time of the accident, was granted guardianship. 5' He subsequently
banned Ms. Thompson from seeing his daughter until his own health
problems caused him to relinquish guardianship. 52 Ms. Thompson peti-
tioned for guardianship, but it was granted to a friend of the family who
did not seek the charge. 53 Upon review, the court of appeals found that
42 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
43 In re Estate of Lasek, 545 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sur. 1989).
44 Id. at 670.
45 Raum v. Rest. Assocs., 675 N.Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div. 1998).
46 In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993).
47 Alison D. v. Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div. 1990).
48 Greenwald v. H & P 29th St. Assocs., 659 N.Y.S.2d 473 (App. Div. 1997).
49 Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 691 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. 1999).
50 In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Minn. App. 1991).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 791-92.
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not only did Ms. Kowalski express a preference to live with Ms. Thomp-
son, but the medical professionals all agreed "that Thompson: (1)
achieve[d] outstanding interaction with Sharon; (2) ha[d] extreme inter-
est and commitment in promoting Sharon's welfare; (3) ha[d] an excep-
tional current understanding of Sharon's physical and mental status and
needs, including appropriate rehabilitation; and (4) [was] strongly
equipped to attend to Sharon's social and emotional needs."'5 4 Eight
years after the initial accident, the court of appeals' decision reunited Ms.
Kowalski and Ms. Thompson. Despite their eventual reunion, it is troub-
ling that Ms. Thompson had to go through the time, expense, and emo-
tional drain of several court proceedings while dealing with her partner's
devastating condition, and that Ms. Kowalski's recovery was delayed by
her unnecessary absence from Ms. Thompson. 55
In order to avoid some of these problems, nontraditional families
may employ devices such as power of attorney and health-care proxy.
Power of attorney authorizes an individual to handle another's financial
responsibilities, such as paying taxes, applying for benefits, paying bills
or borrowing money, if that person becomes incapacitated. 56 Health-care
proxy 57 gives designated individuals priority to decide what medical
measures doctors should take in an emergency.5 8 If such a preference is
not made, state statutes "grant legal relatives, in declining levels of con-
sanguinity the power to act on behalf of the incompetent" with no sug-
gestion that "a lover or close friend of the patient might, in some
circumstances, be a better proxy decisionmaker than a legal relative." 59
Much like the presumptions covering medical decision making, stat-
utes governing the distribution of property, inheritance, and taxation of
inheritance are designed to accommodate traditional families.60 Thus,
alternative families must employ careful estate planning to ensure that
their loved ones are cared for after their deaths. Such strategies include
listing any common property as owned jointly with right of survivorship,
so that upon one partner's death, the property will revert to the survi-
vor;6 1 naming the other member of the couple as the beneficiary on bank
or brokerage accounts, life-insurance policies, or employee-benefit
plans; 62 and creating a living trust, where the creator names herself trus-
54 Id. at 793-94.
55 Id. at 794.
56 Deborah Lohse, Unmarried Couples Can Face Tricky Financial Planning, WALL
STREET J., Mar. 29, 1994, at C1.
57 This is known as medical durable power of attorney in some states.
58 Id.
59 Amy L. Brown, Broadening Anachronistic Notions of "Family" in Proxy Decision-
making For Unmarried Adults, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1036-37 (1990).
60 Melton, supra note 36, at 506.
61 Lohse, supra note 56.
62 Id.
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tee and her partner co-trustee, so that one may sell, exchange or spend
the assets if the other becomes incapacitated. 63 Additionally, "unmarried
partners should take steps to ensure that their will could withstand a legal
challenge by disgruntled relatives." 64 Each party should contact their
own lawyer, and in the case of a debilitating illness, a physician should
offer a signed opinion that the party was aware of her actions. 65
Although devices such as power of attorney or living trusts can take
up where the law leaves off, they are very piecemeal in their approach
and do not grant the overarching benefits and protections that come from
the legal designation "family." In addition, not all such families will
have the means or the know-how to obtain these legal documents. In
specific reference to the property distribution structures, such scenarios
assume valuable property that one would want to invest in protecting;
however such property solutions do little to remedy these concerns of
those with limited belongings and resources. As one commentator noted:
The "estates" of lower income people typically consist
(at most) of Social Security survivors' benefits, workers'
compensation death benefits, and the like; in contrast,
wealthier persons accumulate large amounts of property
and make wills about its disposition. While it is possible
to consult an attorney and draft around the estate laws so
as to protect a [survivor], the death benefits important to
poor people turn upon marital status.66
Also difficult is the fact that medical emergencies and death are
situations that most would rather not think about and plan for. Arguably,
this is the reason that the law has a default scheme in place to begin with.
Rather than putting the responsibility on individuals to remedy the law's
shortcomings, the law should respond and protect such individuals.
2. Adult Adoption
In an attempt to receive the comprehensive benefits and protections
that come with the designation of family, some have employed adult
adoption. This is the practice of one adult legally adopting another to
create a bona fide family relationship. All states except Alabama and
Nebraska offer some form of adult adoption, although many statutes
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage,
75 OR. L. REv. 709, 766 (1996).
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place varying restrictions upon it.67 The primary effect of adult adoption
is the creation of inheritance rights in the adoptee, but there are other
advantages. 68 Through adoptions, adults can obtain next-of-kin rights
that allow decision-making in case of emergency or incapacity, and visi-
tation rights upon hospitalization or imprisonment. 69 Adult adoption also
allows for recovery in tort actions and beneficiary privileges under some
insurance policies, retirement funds, and employee benefit packages. 70
Although this practice confers the wide-ranging benefits usually re-
served for traditional families, there are definite drawbacks. One prob-
lematic aspect is that adult adoption is irrevocable, except in cases of
fraud or undue influence, 71 and destroys the adoptee's legal relationship
with his natural parents, also terminating inheritance rights. 72 One prob-
lem specific to romantic couples using adoption is the psychological im-
pact of forming a "parent-child" relationship with one's partner, even if it
is only a legal designation.73 Additionally, such a parent-child designa-
tion between adult sexual partners could lead to prosecution for incest,
despite the nonexistence of consanguinity. 74
Rather than encouraging individuals to engage in a legal fiction and
tread uncomfortably close to taboo, the law should instead encourage the
formation of adult relationships of mutual caring and support by ex-
tending legal benefits and protections to them.
C. ACTIVISTS AND LAWMAKERS
Rather than relying on the piecemeal protections offered by the ma-
nipulation of legal devices and terms, advocates of lesbian, gay, and bi-
sexual [hereinafter LGB] rights have been seeking recognition of
nontraditional families through a comprehensive scheme.
1. Domestic Partnership
Domestic partnership regulations, present in various cities, counties,
and states throughout the country, allow same-sex couples who meet cer-
tain criteria to register as domestic partners. Although these registration
systems give same-sex partners the chance to have some legal recogni-
tion of their relationship, it is very far from creating parity with hetero-
67 Gwendolyn L. Snodgrass, Creating Family Without Marriage; The Advantages and
Disadvantages of Adult Adoption Among Gay and Lesbian Partners, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L.
75, 81 (1998).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 82.
70 Id. at 83.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 84.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 85.
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sexual relationships. 75 Instead such laws are creating a second-class
version of marriage.
The benefits given under these laws are very slight; they primarily
extend health insurance and sick leave/bereavement leave to the regis-
tered partners of employees of the State.76 In addition to applying to a
very small number of people and providing minimal benefits, domestic
partners are taxed on any health insurance benefits that they receive for
their partner, because such benefits are considered part of the worker's
gross income.77 To become entitled to these sparing benefits, same-sex
couples give "the state the power to regulate [their] primary relation-
ship," and agree to closely conform their conduct to the idealized hetero-
sexual marriage.78 This mimicking of traditional marriage prevents the
reconceptualization of family; it merely expands who is let in to the
law's protections, while still leaving others out.79
In addition to not providing the benefits of marriage, domestic part-
nerships do not provide the protections of marriage. One example of this
is the failure of most domestic partnership laws to offer any sort of pro-
tection at the dissolution of the relationship. This is especially problem-
atic when considering the fact that the nation is in the middle of a
"gayby" boom, with about 2 million school-aged children being raised
by same-sex couples. 80 Since the children of domestic partners are not
explicitly considered in such laws, it is up to the courts to determine the
custody of any children. Often, this means that courts will emphasize
biology in determining custody, 81 instead of considering other factors
such as the intentions of the parties when conceiving the child, the func-
tion of the family before its dissolution, or the child's interest in main-
taining the relationship with the non-biological co-parent.
The State of Vermont recently took strides to lessen the disparity
between domestic partnership and marriage. On December 20, 1999, the
Vermont Supreme Court ruled that same-sex couples must be given the
75 Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to
the Legal Definition of Family 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1658 (1991).
76 Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family," 26 GONZ.
L. REV. 91, n.32 (1991).
77 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9603011, supra note 24.
78 Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in OuT/LoOK:
NAT'L LESuIAN & GAY Q., Autumn 1989, at 8-12.
79 MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 1-2 (1995) (discussing her experience as a Commissioner on the
Madison Wisconsin Equal Opportunities Commission when it first considered an Alternative
Family Ordinance).
80 L.Z. Granderson, My Two Moms, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 11, 1999, at A19.
81 See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (App. 1991); Music v. Rachford, 654
So. 2d 1234 (Fla. App. 1995); Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. App. 1991); In re
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618
N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
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same benefits and protections that are given to married couples, but left it
up to the legislature to decide whether the equalization of benefits would
come through allowing same-sex couples to marry, or whether it would
be achieved through a system of domestic partnership. 2 On April 26,
2000, the Governor of Vermont signed a bill that gave same-sex couples
the same rights and responsibilities available under state law to married
couples, including divorce-like proceedings at the termination of a rela-
tionship.83 The law, which took effect July 1, 2000, gives same-sex
couples access to more than 300 rights derived from Vermont state law,
including inheritance, property transfers, medical decisions, insurance,
and joint filing of state taxes.8 4 These "Civil Unions," the most compre-
hensive system of domestic partnership in the county, create parity be-
tween domestic partnership and marriage at a state level.8 5 However,
federal laws and states other than Vermont will not recognize such
couples.8 6
2. Same-Sex Marriage
Because domestic partnership laws and ordinances do not offer all
the benefits of marriage, some are advocating for an expansion of tradi-
tional marriage rights to same-sex couples. Yet, this idea faces opposi-
tion from those against, as well as in favor of, LGB rights. As many
LGB organizations have put marriage at the forefront of the their
agenda,87 there has been a great deal of opposition by conservative and
religious groups, resulting in the passage of anti-same-sex-marriage
pieces of legislation at both the state and national level. The Federal
Defense of Marriage Act declared that states do not have to give full
faith and credit to the acts and judgments of other states in regards to
82 Christopher Graff, Vermont Supreme Court Calls Rights for Gay Couples "Constitu-
tionally Required." Ruling Described as First of Its Kind in the United States, LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, Dec. 21, 1999, at 4.
83 Vermont First in Nation to OK Gay Civil Unions, CHICAGO TRIB., Apr. 27, 2000, at
18.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See American Civil Liberties Union: Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, at http://www.
aclu.org/issues/gay/hmgl.html; Family Pride Coalition, at http://www.familypride.org; Gay
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, at http://www.glad.org; Gay and Lesbian Alliance
Against Defamation, at http://www.glaad.org; Gay and Lesbian Victory Fund, at http://www.
victoryfund.org/; Human Rights Campaign, at http://www.hrc.org; Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, at http://www.lambdalegal.org; Lesbian and Gay Immigration Rights Task
Force, at http://www.lgirtf.org; National Black Lesbian and Gay Leadership Forum, at http://
www.nblglf.org; National Center for Lesbian Rights, at http://www.nclrights.org; National
Freedom to Marry Coalition, at http://www.ftm.org; National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, at
http://www.ngltf.org; The National Latina/o Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender Organiza-
tion, at http://www.llego.org; National Organization for Women, at http://www.now.org; Par-
ents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays, at http://www.pflag.org.
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same-sex marriage, 88 and defined marriage as a relationship between
only a man and woman. 89 Although this is most likely unconstitutional, 90
it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will consider the Act any time
soon.91
States are also responding with anti-same-sex-marriage initiatives.
As of 2000, 32 states had adopted some form of anti-same-sex marriage
legislation. 92 In those states, the anti-marriage measures are being used
to block other pro-LGB legislation. For example, right-wing legal orga-
nizations have sought to invalidate domestic partnership ordinances
adopted by local governments in Florida,93 Illinois, 94 and Virginia.95
Those challenging benefits for same-sex couples claim that anti-same-
sex marriage laws set forth a "public policy" that only married, mixed-
sex couples can be granted governmental benefits or rights in those
states.
Despite such setbacks, proponents provide several arguments in
support of same-sex marriage. One argument is that same-sex couples
should have the same right to enter the important societal institution of
marriage and partake of the "substantial economic and practical advan-
tages" that result.96 Such a view implicitly assumes that the cultural sig-
88 Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C.
89 Defense of Marriage Act, I U.S.C.A. § 7.
90 See generally Larry Kramer, The Public Policy Exception and the Problem of Extra-
Territorial Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 16 Q.L.R. 153 (1996); Evan Wolson &
Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal Defects in the "Defense of Marriage" Act, 16
Q.L.R. 221 (1996).
91 In order for the constitutionality of DOMA to be considered, a state would first have
to allow same-sex marriage. Once a couple was married in that state, they would then need to
become residents of a state that did not allow same-sex marriage. The couple would then have
to bring a claim against the state, which would have to make its way through the federal court
system. Only then would review by the Supreme Court be a possibility. However, the court
usually refrains from hearing such cases until similar claims have been brought in several
different circuits.
92 Those states are AK, AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY,
LA, MI, ME, MN, MS, MT, ND, NC, OK, PA, SD, TN, UT, VA, WA, and WV. Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, A Historic Victory: Civil Unions for Same-Sex Couples -
What's Next?, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=578
(July 6, 2000).
93 David Fleshier & Buddy Nevins, Domestic Benefits Come Under Attack; Broward's
Proposal for County Employees Challenged Hardest by Those Who Oppose the Gay Lifestyle,
SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Jan. 21, 1999, at IA.
94 Crawford v. Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91, 98 (Il. App. 1999).
95 Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2000) (holding that the county's
inclusion of domestic partners under the term dependent was unreasonable, thus denying
health insurance benefits to such individuals); see also Holly A. Heyser, VA Supreme Court
Annuls Domestic Partner Benefits, VIRGINIAN PILOT AND STAR LEDGER (Norfolk), Apr. 22,
2000, at A I.
96 Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, in OuT/LooK:
NAT'L LESBIAN & GAY Q., supra note 78; Evan Wolfson, Why We Should Fight for the Free-
dom to Marry, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 128, 129 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997).
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nificance of the institution of marriage, with its benefits, rights, rewards,
and subsidies, is only problematic in that it leaves out same-sex couples.
However, many people - gay and straight - do not receive the benefits
of marriage. Cultural norms that place greater emphasis on extended
families cause people of color to marry at lower rates.97 This phenome-
non would make it less likely that lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals
of color would participate in, or receive the benefits from same-sex mar-
riage. 98 Those in poverty are also less likely to partake in marriage be-
cause the economic benefits associated with marriage decrease as the
level of poverty increases. 99 This effect would likely carry over to same-
sex couples in poverty.' 00
Another problem with the pursuit of same-sex marriage is that it is
antithetical to the way that many LGB individuals live their lives. There
is evidence that, like other outsider groups, 10 LGB communities tend to
organize their lives around more extended support systems outside of the
nuclear family.' 0 2 This may be because many LGB individuals are often
alienated from their blood families once they "come out of the closet."
These individuals go on to form familial relationships with others in the
LGB community. 10 3 These surrogate families function in a way very
similar to other families; they celebrate holidays together, console each
other during hard times, and care for one another in times of crisis. 1°4
This is especially true in the context of the AIDS epidemic, "where often
a large group of people - ex-mates and their friends and lovers - tend
the sick and maintain the final watch."' 0 5 Because these informal ar-
rangements serve such vital purposes to the LGB community, they
should be maintained and valued as same-sex couples try to legitimize
their relationships.
Because many LGB individuals have formed their families outside
of the law, they have developed many creative formations of family that
respond to current societal challenges. 10 6 To advocate that same-sex
couples enter into traditional marriage, an institution that is already
97 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual Identity,
and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1370-71 (2000).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 People of color, those in poverty, and the working class are also more likely to follow
extended kinship arrangements, rather than the more traditional nuclear family. Franklin, supra
note 4, at 1047.
102 Frank Browning, Why Marry?, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra note
96, at 132, 134.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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fraught with problems "could stifle one of the richest and most creative
laboratories of family experience."'' 0 7 Rather than expanding the rights
of some to marry, a more helpful strategy would be seeking "civic and
legal support for different kinds of relationships that can address the
emotional, physical and financial obligations of contemporary life."' 08
D. INTERGENERATIONAL DEPENDENCY - ONE SCHOLAR'S APPROACH
In her groundbreaking book, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Fam-
ily, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies, Professor Martha Fineman
critiques the way that family is defined and offers her own solution. 10 9
Fineman is concerned that only those "relationships that could be analo-
gized to marriage" are considered in attempts to expand the category of
family.' l0 Fineman critiques the fact that the "sexual core" (a horizontal
tie between sexual affiliates) is the center of the family, when other rela-
tionships in our society, such as the vertical intimacy between a parent
and child, are much more stable. " Fineman proposes to abolish mar-
riage as a legal category, and instead seeks to make the caretaker/child
relationship the core of the family unit.' 12
Although Fineman's theoretical perspective seems exactly right, in
that she questions the privileged role of the nuclear family and the label
of deviance for those outside of it, her solution to privatize adult relation-
ships is still somewhat problematic.' 13 Although this approach seems to
place everyone in a similar position vis-A-vis the law, it fails to consider
the realities of people's lives. Individuals will continue to form signifi-
cant and intimate relationships that are distinctly different from the pro-
totypical "arms-length" relationships usually considered within the legal
context. Insofar as that is the case, it is necessary that the law be able to
provide the most humane and effective way to deal with these intimate
and emotional relationships.
Furthermore, same-sex couples and other deviant family forms are
currently living with privatized relationships that are "not sanctioned,
privileged, or preferred by law."' 14 However, as shown in the foregoing
sections, the results have been highly problematic. Even those who
know that the law will not protect them sometimes fail to establish power
of attorney, a will, contracts regarding the dissolution of a relationship,
107 Id. at 133.
108 ld.
109 FINEMAN, supra note 79.
110 Id. at 1.
I ld. at 3.
112 Id. at 4.
113 Id. at 6.
114 id. at 5.
A NEW WAY OF DEFINING FAMILY
and other legal documents.' 15 Merely extending privatized relational sta-
tus to married individuals would just extend such problem to a wider
class of people. Instead, there needs to be some realization of the so-
cially important and sustaining work that goes on within adult relation-
ships, in addition to the caretaker/dependent model, by recognizing,
protecting, and facilitating their functioning.
II. THE TICKET SYSTEM
In the following pages, I will outline the foundation for a new the-
ory of family called the Ticket System. To demonstrate how this system
works, I will begin by applying it to the traditional nuclear family. Such
focus and comparison is used only to make it conceptually easier to un-
derstand. Once the Ticket System is explained within the more tradi-
tional framework, I will then expand the discussion to the other ways in
which it can operate. Finally, I will consider possible critiques of this
approach.
A. ADULTS' RELATIONSHIPS AND THE TICKET SYSTEM
At the age of eighteen, an individual would receive ten tickets. 116
Nine are designated "Interdependency Tickets" [hereinafter "Tickets"],
and one is a Primary Interdependency Ticket [hereinafter "Primary Tick-
ets"], which confer the type of benefits that the law typically presumes to
flow towards one's spouse and can only be exchanged between adults."17
115 See supra Part I.B.1.
116 The number ten was selected because it seems large enough to include most key indi-
viduals in one's life, and still small enough to be socially manageable. However, individuals
can certainly exchange less than ten.
When I have spoken to people about this idea, many think ten is an enormous number,
perhaps because when translated to the current system, it compares to a spouse and nine chil-
dren. Being originally from Utah, the state with the largest family size in the nation, families
of this size are not uncommon. However, the fact that some individuals receive tax breaks for
their enormous families breeds resentment among smaller families who are paying a greater
amount in taxes, despite using less state resources. See Dan Harrie, Large Families' Tax
Break May Shrink, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 14, 2001, at At (discussing a state bill that would
limit the state tax break given to families of three or more members and funnel the increased
revenue into public schools). However, if everyone could enter a benefited relationship with
10 people, if they so chose, then the resources would be much more fairly allocated across the
board. People like Gail Ruzika, the president of Utah's ultra-conservative Eagle Forum and
member of a family of 14, who worked to defeat the aforementioned bill, would not be able to
count on the state to subsidize more than ten of her family members. Id. However, single
people could enter into benefited relationships with their roommates, parents, friends, siblings,
and nieces or nephews. Thus, everyone has the same opportunity to benefit from the legal
designation "family," to the same degree.
117 These benefits include preference in being appointed the personal representative of an
intestate decedent; priority in being appointed guardian of an incapacitated individual or the
right to act for an incapacitated person in making health care decisions; all manner of rights
relating to the involuntary hospitalization of the individual, including the right to petition, the
right to be notified, and the right to initiate proceeding leading to release; the right to bring
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Tickets can be exchanged between individuals for the purpose of
demonstrating that they are involved in an interdependent relationship.
By exchanging Tickets, the parties can then gain access to benefits that
are typically given only to nuclear families, such as health insurance,' 1 8
immigration rights,' 19 tax subsidies, and any other right presently con-
ferred by only blood, marriage, or adoption. After a proscribed waiting
period, 90 days for example, the Ticket would take effect. ' 20 These Tick-
ets could be exchanged with anyone, including lovers, children, parents,
siblings, grandparents, extended relatives, friends, strangers, etc. The
only requirement is that Tickets of the same type are exchanged, so one
cannot be in a benefited interdependent relationship with more than ten
people at a time and may have only one Primary Ticket relationship (al-
though one is still free to have a large family, many friends, and numer-
ous interdependent relationships). If one wanted to end a Ticketed
relationship, he or she would transfer the Ticket back over to the other
party, and the other person would do the same. 12 Within a specified
period of time, such as 90 days, the relationship would be dissolved 22
and both individuals would be free to exchange Tickets with another
person.
For purposes of illustration, imagine a childless heterosexual adult
couple seeking to marry. Under the Ticket System, the couple could still
have any type of wedding ceremony that they wanted, including a relig-
ious service, but instead of signing a marriage license, the couple would
exchange Tickets.
If they wanted their relationship to be similar to the current concep-
tion of marriage, they would exchange Primary Tickets. Prior to the ex-
wrongful death suits and suits for the intentional infliction of emotional distress; the right to
claim an evidentiary privilege for communication; the presumption of joint ownership or real
estate as a tenancy in common, and the right not to be held to a mortgage of assignment of
rights to creditors without the individual's written permission; the right to priority in claiming
human remains and the right to make anatomical donations on behalf of the individual; inheri-
tance rights, including priority in inheriting property of an intestate decedent, the right to a
family allowance, and the rights to dower; and the right to receive social security benefits
based on the individual's contribution and the survivor benefits of veterans. WILLIAM N. Es-
KRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 793 (1997).
118 The right to benefits statutorily guaranteed to public employees, including health and
life insurance and disability payments, plus similar contractual benefits for private sector em-
ployees. Id.
119 Ticket holders would have the right to qualify as an "immediate relative," thus getting
preferential immigration treatment and the right to citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i),
§ 1430(a), (b), (d).
120 The waiting period ensures that people are committed to their decision, and acts as a
protection against benefits being shifted based on who needs them at that moment.
121 If one refused to return a Ticket at the request of the grantor, they would be compelled
to do so through legal channels.
122 Allowing for immediate dissolution would open the door to too much legal
uncertainty.
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change of Primary Tickets, it would possible for them to see a State-
provided counselor to formulate an arrangement for the division of prop-
erty upon dissolution of the relationship. 123 These counselors, similar to
mediators, would help the individuals arrive at an understanding and
would be trained to ensure that both parties are protected under the
agreement.
Although the use of a counselor may seem like unnecessary State
involvement, the State is already involved in the process of distributing
property at the dissolution of a relationship. Rather than investing re-
sources in divorce proceedings, the State would instead invest the re-
sources at the beginning of the relationship, where they would do the
most good. This process would prevent individuals from entering the
relationship "without any information, communication, or realistic ex-
change with a partner." 124 By clarifying the expectations and wishes of
the parties prior to formalizing their relationship, hopefully the union
would be more enduring.
If a Primary Ticket couple chose not to go through the counseling
process, there would be an automatic division of all property acquired
during the relationship, and a pooling and equal division of all income
earned following the dissolution of the relationship for a period equal to
the time that they were in the Primary Ticket relationship. This would be
to ensure that those traditionally disadvantaged by no-fault divorce
schemes are adequately protected. 125
If the couple did not exchange Primary Tickets, but one of the nine
regular Tickets, their relationship would be a sort of "commitment-lite."
This would be similar to couples that cohabitate under the current
scheme. These individuals would not have the right to the other person's
property upon death, the right to make key medical decisions and the
like. These rights and responsibilities would rest with the Primary Ticket
Holder, who could be a parent, best friend, or any other individual.
Upon dissolution of the relationship, there would be no division of prop-
erty, absent some sort of formalized arrangement prior to the exchange of
Tickets.
123 If one were exchanging a ticket with a parent, best friend, or sibling, there may not be
the same sort of property considerations, and the parties could contract to keep separate prop-
erty and have no support obligations.
124 Megan Gomola, Something Old, Something New: On the "Romance" of Prenups,
CORNELL MAGAZINE, May/June 2001, at 24.
125 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
773 (discussing feminist critiques of no-fault divorce).
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B. CHILDREN'S RELATIONSHIPS AND THE TICKET SYSTEM
Because the relationships between adults and children are more
complex due to the child's dependency, the Ticket System takes on a
different form when applied to them. Upon birth, a child would be en-
dowed with two Principal Dependency Tickets and eight Dependency
Tickets. The parent or parents of the child would determine who holds
these tickets. In the case of our above heterosexual couple, they could
decide that they each want to be a Primary Ticket Holder for the child.
Unlike adult relationships, where the same types of Tickets must be
exchanged, when an adult takes on the Primary Ticket of a child, they
exchange one of their regular Tickets for one of the child's Primary Tick-
ets. Thus, the parent in our scenario could hold the Primary Interdepen-
dent Ticket for their spouse, as well a Primary Dependency Ticket for
their child.
Taking on the Primary Dependency Ticket of a child is an assurance
that one will physically, financially, and emotionally support a child, un-
til that child reaches the age of 18. In contrast to adult relationships,
adult/child Primary Ticket relationships can only be revoked by the
State. 126
If each of the child's parents is holding a Primary Ticket, then there
are still eight other Dependency Tickets that the parents may distribute.
These can be given to grandparents, godparents, etc. When a Primary
Ticket Holder gives a Ticket to another adult on behalf of a child, the
parent is in effect sanctioning the formation of an enduring relationship.
If a Primary Ticket Holder later decides to revoke a Ticket on behalf of
the child, the former Ticket Holder can seek visitation from the court. 127
The point of allowing for continuing visitation is to ensure that there is a
forum for determining the needs and wishes of the child, before the Pri-
mary Ticket Holder unilaterally denies anyone the right to the child.
This gives rise to one potential problem; parents may be reluctant to
distribute Tickets, because they do not want to give up control of their
child. Under the current system, where children are viewed in a manner
similar to private property,12 8 allowing others continued access to one's
children is an uneasy proposition. However, courts are increasingly rec-
ognizing that children, even very young ones, form important relation-
126 The analogy to the current system would be when the State decides to terminate paren-
tal rights.
127 Of course, when the Primary Ticket Holder is refusing access to a Ticket Holder be-
cause the interaction is harmful or dangerous to the child, then the courts will not sanction
visitation.
128 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 86 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("But even a fit
parent is capable of treating a child like a mere possession.").
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ships with people other than their parents. As a result, rights to visitation
are being extended to other individuals.1 29
Additionally, it is doing what is in the best interest of the child -
giving them continued access to people with whom they have formed
emotional bonds.' 30 It is far too common that children are used as pawns
in adult disputes. By initially giving the Primary Ticket Holder the right
to distribute Tickets, but later asking the State to protect those relation-
ships once the child and the Ticket Holder have formed a relationship,
the likelihood that children will be caught in a tug of war between people
they care about will be lessened.
Furthermore, this system offers parents added benefits and protec-
tions not found under the current arrangements. First, by designating a
few Ticket Holders for their children, there is an assurance that a child
would have continued visitation with important family members if death
befell the parents/Primary Ticket Holders. Under the current system,
once custody is passed on to someone else, it is not uncommon for
grandparents and siblings to lose all visitation rights. 131 Also, by having
a child exchange Tickets with another adult, that child will be entitled to
any benefits that person may have.
Back to our hypothetical couple: they are now Primary Ticket Hold-
ers to one another, and are Primary Ticket Holders of their biological
child. They decide that they want the infant child's grandparents to be-
come Ticket Holders.132 If the grandparents agree to this, the Tickets
will be exchanged, and both the child, the child's parents, and the grand-
129 Id. at 64 (Despite holding that a Washington visitation statute was overbroad, the
Supreme Court stated, "persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing
frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing .... The nationwide enactment of
nonparental visitation statutes is assuredly due, in some part, to the States' recognition of these
changing realities of the American family."); see also Settle v. Galloway, 682 So. 2d 1032
(Miss. 1996) (granting visitation to grandparents because father was unable to exercise visita-
tion rights due to military service); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 684 A.2d 1352 (N.H. 1996) (giving
grandparents the standing to seek visitation with an out-of-wedlock child, although denying
the grandparents' request because of a failure to justify intrusion on parental rights); Peterson
v. Peterson, 559 N.W.2d 826 (N.D. 1997) (grandparents who were granted visitation during
parents' separation had a right to continued visitation once parents reunited and objected);
Thrift v. Baldwin, 473 S.E.2d 715 (Va. App. 1996) (granting biological grandparents and
sibling visitation with children who had been adopted by third parties).
130 Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879,
881 (1984).
131 Ward v. Dibble, 683 So. 2d 666 (Fla. App. 1996) (denying maternal grandmother
visitation with deceased daughter's children because there was no competent evidence that
visitation was in children's best interests); Ken R. on Behalf of C.R. v. Arthur Z., 682 A.2d
1267 (Pa. 1996) (holding that children do not have standing to seek court-ordered visitation
with siblings).
132 In the first three months after a child is born, all Tickets exchanges take effect imme-
diately. After that time period, Ticket exchanges are subject to the 90-day waiting period
before they take effect. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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parents will know that there is an expectation that the grandparents will
be involved in the child's life to a certain extent. In contributing to the
welfare of the child, one grandparent may put the child on her health
insurance, while another grandparent may decide to watch the child on
the weekends. If the couple separates, and the mother/Primary Ticket
Holder of the child has primary custody, she cannot then refuse the pater-
nal grandparents access to the child.
Furthermore, to protect themselves, grandparents could stipulate
that they want a recognized and continuous (i.e., Ticketed) relationship
with their grandchild, before they begin to invest time and resources in
that child. If a parent wants to remain in absolute control of a child, then
she will not be able to expect the help of others in her community, unless
there are assurances that all the relationships will be protected. This does
not mean that grandparents or similar Ticket Holders have rights on par
with parents/Primary Ticket Holders. Primary Ticket Holders can con-
tinue to set limits, and expect Ticket Holders to respect their wishes in
bringing up the child.
This system still provides the stability of a traditional nuclear fam-
ily, but also ensures that children's needs and relationships will be pro-
tected, even when adult relationships deteriorate. Furthermore, it creates
a greater acknowledgement of the many different types of caretaking
work that goes on in families. Currently, most parents have to rely on
others to help in the task of nurturing children. Yet, despite the roles of
many people in raising a child, parents continue to view children as their
private and discrete property. By explicitly acknowledging the many
roles that people play in a child's life, it becomes more likely that these
roles will proliferate for the benefit of all those involved in the
relationship.
As a child ages, his voice in the Ticketing process should become
more recognized. 133 Primary Ticket Holders are still involved in the pro-
cess until the child reaches the age of majority, and must initiate or agree
to the Ticket exchange, but as the child increases in maturity, her/his role
in the process becomes greater. At a certain age, somewhere between ten
and twelve, a child should be allowed to have veto power over the ex-
change of Tickets suggested by the Primary Ticket Holder.' 34
When children reach eighteen, they start over with a clean slate.
They are given one Primary Interdependency Ticket and nine regular In-
133 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights:" The
Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 321, 340 (1994). ("Law should
empower [children] to act as subjects in shaping their identities according to their emerging
capacity, rather than treating them as objects.").
134 For example, if a child does not want to have a Ticketed relationship with a parent's
new spouse, then the parent should not be able to compel her/him to do this.
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terdependency Tickets, which they can redistribute in any manner they
choose. Within three months of an individual's eighteenth birthday, all
Tickets exchanges take effect immediately. After that time there is the
usual ninety-day waiting period.
C. APPLICATION OF THE TICKET SYSTEM TO NONTRADITIONAL
RELATIONSHIPS
To illustrate how the Ticket System would operate within nontradi-
tional families, I will apply it to two court cases where the results
reached were less than ideal.
In the case In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y., a lesbian couple employed
artificial insemination in order to have a child. 135 The women selected a
gay man as their sperm donor and subsequently bore a child. 136 The
child had limited contact with the sperm donor/biological father until the
age of three. 137 At that time the mothers made arrangements for the
child to meet the biological father. 138 Over the next few years the bio-
logical father would pay visits to the child and her mothers.' 39 Eventu-
ally, the biological father desired a more pronounced role in the child's
life. 140 The mothers wanted visitation to continue on the same level that
it had in the past, but did not want the biological father to establish a
paternal relationship. 14 1
The father brought the case to court, and on appeal, the New York
Supreme Court awarded him parental rights with the possibility of visita-
tion. 142 In this case, the court decided as they usually do, by looking to
biology to determine parenthood. 143 Courts continually apply such out-
dated precedent, rather than looking to the actual intention of the parties,
or even the best interest of the child. "44 It is clear that in this case, the
sperm donor had no intention of becoming a functioning parent to the
child.
If the Ticket System were in place, then the events would unfold
quite differently. I will assume that both of the women work and that at
least one of them has health insurance. First, the lesbian mothers could
be Primary Interdependency Ticket Holders for one another, thus giving
135 In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (App. Div. 1994).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 358.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 362.
143 Id. at 359. States typically do not recognize relationships formed by adults other than
the child's legal/biological parents, "unless the legal parents are unfit and have abandoned the
child." Bartlett, supra note 130, at 881.
144 Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
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them the benefits now reserved for married couples. They would be able
to file a joint income tax return, could use one party's insurance to pay
for the expenses associated with pregnancy and delivery, and could use
the Family and Medical Leave Act or various other private parental leave
to be present for the birth of the child. Once the child is born the
mothers could claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes, and the
healthcare benefits of one of the mothers for the child. Both mothers
would be recognized Primary Dependency Ticket Holders for the child,
and would have all the legal rights that parents have under the current
system.
In deciding who they would like to use as a sperm donor, the wo-
men could make it clear to the donor that they would be the Primary
Dependency Ticket Holders for the child, giving them primary guardian-
ship until the child reaches eighteen. If both the mothers and the donor
wanted to allow the child to have some form of relationship with the
sperm donor/biological father, they could allow him to exchange regular
Tickets with the child. The exchange of regular Tickets would signal to
all of the parties that the donor would have a role in the child's life, albeit
a lesser one. The donor/biological father would have the assurance of a
relationship with the child, but the mothers/Primary Ticket Holder would
have the ultimate authority to decide the form that relationship would
take. If for some reason the mothers denied the donor/biological father
the right to a reasonable relationship with the child, he could use the
courts to compel visitation.
In the case of INS v. Hector, the limited definition of family was
also harmful. In that case a woman who had been in the country for
seven years sought to avoid deportation due to the fact that she was rais-
ing her two adolescent nieces. 145 Despite the fact that "Hector's relation-
ship with her nieces closely resembles a parent-child relationship" she
did not meet the statutory definition, and was subject to deportation.146
Under the Ticket System, Ms. Hector could exchange Primary Tick-
ets with her nieces, thereby establishing the rights and privileges cur-
rently only given to parents. This would allow Ms. Hector to remain in
the country and avoid the disruption of their family unit.
D. POSSIBLE CRITIQUES AND RESPONSES
The most obvious shortcoming is that it seems rather unlikely that
any state is going to rush out to pass "The Uniform Inter/Dependency
Ticket Act." This model, although similar to what many communities
informally do, may be conceptually difficult for many to comprehend.
145 INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1989).
146 Id. at 90.
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The possibility of a family existing without connection to blood or mar-
riage may just be too radical. I would hope that the added practical bene-
fits to everyone, 14 7 such as the ability for an individual to put his elderly
mother, adult children, or grandchildren on his health insurance, would
make one more willing to consider this an option.
Even if it were possible to convince people to sign on to this system,
it would still be difficult to gain the support of government and busi-
nesses. Currently, the government and corporations are doing little to
support various forms of care taking, although they certainly benefit
from its occurrence. 148 Because there is no requirement for corporations
to provide health insurance, there is the risk that they would discontinue
it and other benefits completely, rather than pay the added costs. 149
Thus, before this system were to take effect, it would be necessary to
have some sort of universal healthcare, or a government mandate for
employers to provide families minimum healthcare benefits, much like
the minimum wage requirement.
Although corporations would probably be spending more money,
there is the possibility that the government would be spending less. Be-
cause people could be placed on their Ticketed family member's insur-
ance, many could be moved off of government programs like Medicare
and Medicaid. This in turn, may give the government more money to
invest in the economy, or allow them to lessen the tax burden on
individuals.
III. CONCLUSION
Despite the possible shortcomings, the advantages of the Ticket
System seem to be great. Unlike the current system, the Ticket System
explicitly recognizes and values the work done by multifarious family
forms. Thus, the Ticket System can explicitly benefit those families tra-
ditionally denied protection at law. The Western and bourgeois concept
of the nuclear family disadvantages people of color, those in poverty, and
others who, out of custom and necessity, are much more likely to rely on
extended kinship structures to do the work of the family.' 50 These indi-
viduals are performing the same valuable work for society that the nu-
clear families are; yet these groups are denied the same benefits. Under
the Ticket System, the devaluation of alternate family forms is lessened.
147 With the exception of those that already have ten or more dependents.
148 This trend may be changing, with many companies offering same-sex and cohabitating
couples benefits in order to attract and maintain top employees. America's Talent Battle, the
Real Meaning of Empowerment: How to Recruit and Keep the Best Workers is Now the Big-
gest Challenge Facing Many America Firms, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2000, available at 2000
WL 8141232.
149 Franklin, supra note 4, at 1047.
150 Franklin, supra note 4, at 1047.
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Also, the Ticket System explicitly recognizes that interdependency
within society is a necessity, as well as a good, and as such, should be
rewarded by government benefits. 15' Social recognition of the impor-
tance of interdependent relationships has the power to create an ideologi-
cal shift in our collective consciousness, creating a society less obsessed
with the notions of autonomy and individual liberties, and more focused
on the communal good. Such a re-conception could also lead to changes
in international, environmental, and social policy.
Despite the fact that my argument is somewhat utopian, I ultimately
hope that it will prompt a creative consideration of the way that we as a
society choose to define families, and make law and policy makers aware
of the fact that there are many that are being unfairly denied the benefits
and the protections of the law. In the last fifty years, familial arrange-
ments have drastically changed; it is time for our laws and policies to
reflect these changes. To truly strengthen the family in our society, we
need to acknowledge and support the valuable work that families are
doing, regardless of form.
151 FINEMAN, supra note 79, at 161-66.
